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Analogical reasoning is conceptualized by Relational Frame 
Theory as responding in accordance with an equivalence relation 
between equivalence or other types of derived stimulus relations. The 
purpose of this study was to provide an empirical demonstration of 
analogy using the Relational Evaluation Procedure (REP) , a recently 
developed technique for the rapid training and testing of derived 
stimulus relations. The experiment involved 9 stages in which 5 adult 
male subjects were exposed to a complex series of REP training and 
testing protocols, by the end of which they each readily demonstrated 
24 completely novel instances of responding in accordance with 
analogical relations as conceptualized by RFT. The implications of 
these results for future functional analytic investigations of analogical 
reasoning are discussed. 
Analogy is undoubtedly an important feature of human language and 
cognition. Apart from its use in the elucidation of novel concepts in such 
fields as science, technology, and education, for example, it is also a 
ubiquitous aspect of everyday human communication . Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, there has been extensive psychological research devoted to 
understanding and modeling this phenomenon. 
Theoretical and empirical analysis of analogical language has 
traditionally been seen as the preserve of the cognitivist approach (e.g. , 
Vosniadou & Ortony, 1989). From this perspective, analogy has most 
often been understood in terms of the mapping of relational information 
from one domain (the base domain) to another (the target domain). 
Eysenck and Keane (2000) list several symbolic representational models 
that incorporate these characteristics, includin£j the Structure Mapping 
Engine (e.g. , Forbus, Ferguson, & Gentner, 1994), the Incremental 
Analogy Machine (e.g., Keane, Ledgeway, &, Duff, 1994), and the 
Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). More 
recent cogn itivist research has begun to produc9! connectionist models of 
analogy (e.g., LISA [Learning and Inference based on Schemas and 
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Analogies; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997]; DRAMA [Distributed 
Representation Analogy MApper; Eliasmith & Thagard, 2001 D, which are 
seen as more flexible with regard to semantic content as well as more 
neurologically plausible. From a behavior analytic perspective, however, a 
key weakness shared by both the newer connectionist as well as the 
earlier representational models is that they define analogical reasoning 
using information processing concepts such as 'mapping' and 'knowledge 
transfer' that remain ill -defined within the behavioral tradition. 
Furthermore, though the new generation of connectionist models appear 
to have certain important advantages over their predecessors, it is 
arguable that they are more interesting as models of neurological rather 
than of psychological functioning. 
Until relatively recently, behavior analysis provided little in the way of an 
alternative to this cognitivist approach. The main contribution was the 
relatively early, and largely interpretive work of B. F. Skinner (1957). For 
Skinner, analogy was a form of 'metaphorical extension,' which was itself 
classified as a subtype of the 'extended tact.' The tact is a behavioral relation 
that is defined as "a verbal operant in which a response of a given form is 
evoked (or at least strengthened) by a particular object or event or property 
of an object or event" (pp. 81-82). The extended tact is a feature of more 
complex verbal behavior that occurs when a response is evoked by a novel 
stimulus that resembles a stimulus previously present when a response was 
reinforced. Metaphorical verbal behavior is a subtype of this latter class of 
behavior that takes place "because of the control exercised by properties of 
the stimulus which, though present at reinforcement, do not enter into the 
contingency respected by the verbal community" (p. 92). The following is an 
example of the Skinnerian interpretation of metaphorical extension that 
appears in 'Verbal Behavior' (1957): 
When for the first time a speaker calls someone a mouse, we 
account for the response by noting certain properties-smallness, 
timidity, silent movement and so on-which are common to the 
kind of situation in which the response is characteristically 
reinforced and to the particular situation in which the response is 
now emitted. Since these are not the properties used by zoologists 
or by the lay community as the usual basis for reinforcing a 
response we call the extension metaphorical. (p.93) 
A similar description of the phenomenon of metaphorical extension 
appears in 'Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior' (1989): 
When we speak of weighing evidence [for example] we are using 
a metaphor. But a metaphor is a word that is "carried over" from 
one referent to another on the basis of a common property. The 
common property in weighing is the conversion of one kind of thing 
(potatoes or evidence) into another (a number on a scale or a 
verdict) . Once we have seen this kind of thing done with potatoes 
it is easier to see it done with evidence ... We could also say that 
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weight becomes abstract when we move from potatoes to 
evidence. The word is indeed abstracted in the sense of its being 
drawn away from its original referent, but it continues to refer to a 
common property, and, as in the case of metaphor, in a possibly 
more decisive way. The testimony in a trial is much more complex 
than a sack of potatoes, and "guilty" probably implies more than 
"ten pounds." But abstraction is not a matter of complexity. Quite 
the contrary. Weight is only one aspect of a potato, and guilt is only 
one aspect of a person. Weight is as abstract as guilt. It is only 
under verbal contingencies of reinforcement that we respond to 
single properties of things or persons. In doing so we abstract the 
property from the thing or person. (p. 7) 
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In these quotations, Skinner essentially conceptualizes analogy as the 
abstraction, via one particular subtype of vE3rbai behavior (i.e., the 
extended tact), of a common physical property from two different types of 
environmental event. This conceptualization undoubtedly provides a 
useful starting point for the analysis of analo~~ical language. However, 
supplementary accounts of the behavioral processes underlying this 
phenomenon are required. For example, how does a repertoire of 
analogical verbal behavior, such as "A is to B as C is to 0," develop from 
a (presumably) simpler repertoire of formal property abstraction? This is 
one important question left unanswered by the Skinnerian analysis. 
Furthermore, this analysis is interpretational only. Empirical analyses of 
analogy are required in order to provide a more complete behavior 
analytic treatment of this phenomenon. 
More recent behavior analytic work has attempted to provide such 
analyses. The theoretical background to this work is Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), a modern, 
explicitly functional analytic approach to language and cognition that 
investigates these phenomena as examples of derived relational 
responding (ORR). The most well researched example of ORR is 
equivalence responding. For example, a person might be trained to 
choose A in the presence of Band B in the presence of C and might 
subsequently demonstrate the untrained responses of choosing B in the 
presence of A, C in the presence of B, A in the presence of C, and C in 
the presence of A. These responses are evidence that the person is now 
relating the training stimuli as equivalent to each other. In other words, 
based on the training, a subject derives a relation of equivalence between 
the stimuli involved. Relational Frame Theory seE3S equivalence as a basic 
and prototypical form of ORR, claiming that it is particularly important in 
the analysis of language in that it appears to provide a laboratory analog 
of linguistic reference. At the same time, equivalence is only one example 
of the phenomenon of ORR. Other examples that have been 
demonstrated in the behavioral laboratory include responding in 
accordance with relations of opposition, distinction, and comparison. 
Steele and Hayes (1991), for example, provided an empirical 
demonstration of responding in accordance with relations of equivalence 
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and difference. In one experiment, subjects were pretrained to relate 
physically identical stimuli in the presence of an arbitrary stimulus, 
referred to as the contextual cue of SAME and to relate physically 
different stimuli in the presence of a second contextual cue 
(DIFFERENT). The researchers then trained and tested subjects in a 
number of related conditional discriminations, with each discrimination 
taking place in the presence of one of the two contextual cues. For 
example, having been trained to relate A1 to C1 in the presence of SAME, 
and A1 to B2 in the presence of DIFFERENT, subjects subsequently 
related B2 to C1 when presented with the DIFFERENT cue. More recent 
research has replicated and extended this early work (e.g., Dymond & 
Barnes, 1994, 1995, 1996; Roche & Barnes, 1996). 
Recently, RFT researchers have begun to provide derived relational 
responding based models of analogy. Barnes, Hegarty, and Smeets 
(1997) provided the first functional-analytic RFT-based model of 
analogical reasoning as responding in accordance with equivalence 
relations between equivalence relations. In the authors' own words: 
Consider ... the following question based on the classic proportion 
scheme (A : B :: C : ?) ; "apple is to orange as dog is to: (i) sheep, 
or (ii) book?". If "apple" and "orange" participate in an equivalence 
relation in the context "fruit," and "dog" and "sheep" participate in 
an equivalence relation in the context "animals" then we would 
expect a person to pick "sheep" as the correct answer. In effect, the 
response would be in accordance with the derived equivalence 
relation between two already established separate equivalence 
relations. . . We take the view that equivalence-equivalence 
responding is an example of a relational network as defined by 
relational frame theory (e.g. , Barnes, 1994; Barnes & Holmes, 
1991 ; Hayes, 1991 , 1994) (p. 3). 
In the study reported by Barnes et al. (1997), subjects were trained, using 
a standard matching-to-sample format, to make the following conditional 
discriminations: A 1---..B1, A2---..B2, A 1---..C1, A2---..C2, A3---..B3, A3---..C3, 
A4---..B4, A4---..C4. Four equivalence relations then emerged: B1 <->C1, 
B2<->C2, B3<->C3, B4<->C4. Tests were then conducted to determine whether 
equivalence relations between equivalence relations (e.g., B1C1 <->B3C3) 
and equivalence relations between nonequivalence relations (e.g., 
B1 B2<->C3C4) would emerge. Results showed that a range of subjects did 
indeed demonstrate this 'equivalence-equivalence' responding. 
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets (2001) recently extended 
this initial model in accordance with Skinner's (1957) interpretation of 
analogy. Specifically, these authors argued that in addition to the arbitrary 
relations established by Barnes et al. (1997), analogy often involves the 
abstraction of common formal properties (see Skinner's discussion of 
'metaphorical extension,' 1957, p. 92). In the example given above, for 
instance, the arbitrary equivalence relation between the words "apple" 
and "orange" is based, to some degree, on the nonarbitrary or physical 
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relation of similarity between actual apples and actual oranges (Le., both 
are small, spherical, edible, sweet, etc.). Similarly, the arbitrary 
equivalence relation between the words "dog" and "sheep" is based on 
the nonarbitrary relation of similarity between actual dogs and actual 
sheep (Le., in general, they are four legged, mobile, hairy, etc). Thus, the 
equivalence-equivalence or analogical relation between the equivalence 
relations 'apple-orange' and 'dog-sheep' may be traced back to the formal 
relations that obtain between particular objects in the environment. 
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, et al. (2001), therefore, attempted to 
include the role of formal properties in the Barnes et al. (1997) model. 
Subjects were taught, using a delayed matching-to-sample procedure, 
to choose a particular nonsense syllable in the presence of each of four blue 
and four red geometric shapes. In a subsequent test, subjects demonstrated 
equivalence responding based on the abstraction of color by consistently 
matching nonsense syllables related to same-colored shapes to each other. 
Subjects then showed equivalence-equivalence responding in which 
equivalence relations from the previous part of the experiment were related 
to other equivalence relations, and nonequivalence relations were related to 
other nonequivalence relations. Thus, these researchers provided a 
demonstration of equivalence-equivalence responding based on the 
abstraction of common formal properties, thereby extending the functional-
analytic model of Barnes et al. (1997) to incorporate what appears to be an 
important feature of analogy. 
Both the Stewart et al. (2001) and Barnes et al. (1997) studies trained 
and tested subjects using the matching-to-sample procedure (see also 
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2002). One possible criticism 
of this procedure, however, is that the extensive training and testing 
involved in this procedure results in the demonstration of a limited number 
of analogies (Le., only those that are possible based on the trained and 
tested equivalence relations). A relatively new methodology might solve 
this problem, however. Following the empirical demonstration of multiple 
stimulus relations in a number of studies, Hayes and Barnes (1997) 
argued for the need to develop new methodologies so that multiple 
stimulus relations might be analyzed and experimentally manipulated 
more readily than is possible with the traditional MTS procedure. One 
methodology that they suggested as suitable for this work was the 
Relational Evaluation Procedure (REP; see also Hayes et aI., 2001; 
Cullinan, Barnes, & Smeets, 1998; Cullinan, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 
2000). The core feature of the REP is that it allows subjects to evaluate, 
or report on , the stimulus relation or relations that are presented on a 
given trial. In the typical approach, subjects may confirm or deny the 
applicability of particular stimulus relations to other sets of stimulus 
relations. For example, on a typical trial , a subject might be presented 
with a contextual cue for DIFFERENT and two arbitrary stimuli that are 
specified within that trial as participating in a difference relation. The 
subject is then required to choose between two arbitrary shapes for which 
the response functions of TRUE and FALSE have previously been 
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established. In this case, the subject should choose TRUE, because the 
DIFFERENT cue coordinates with the arbitrary stimulus relation. If the 
cue had been SAME or the stimulus relation had been one of sameness, 
the appropriate choice would have been FALSE. In pilot studies using this 
methodology, it has been found that once a number of appropriate 
contextual cues have been established, a potentially infinite number of 
relational responses may be observed. The critical point is that the 
number of relational responses that may be observed is not constrained 
by the prior training and testing of a specific set of derived relations. Given 
the apparent power of this methodology to generate unconstrained 
numbers of derived stimulus relations, it might now be adopted by 
researchers exploring a number of disparate areas. In the context of the 
current study, the REP may be useful in the analysis of relating relations, 
which RFT views as the key characteristic of analogical and metaphorical 
language (Stewart et aI., 2002). In the current article, we describe how we 
have used the REP to analyze the relating of relations. As in the example 
provided above, contextual cues are presented with stimulus relations, 
and TRUE and FALSE response options. However, in the present study, 
the critical arbitrary stimulus relations are relations between stimulus 
relations rather than between individual stimuli. For example, if a SAME 
cue is presented with two stimulus pairs, each of which participates in a 
difference relation , the appropriate choice in this case is TRUE, because 
the relations between the two pairs are the same. 
Method 
Subjects 
Five subjects, all Caucasian males, participated in this experiment. 
The ages of the subjects ranged from 19 to 31 years (mean = 25). One of 
the subjects was a non-psychology undergraduate student, two were 
non-psychology graduate students, and the remaining two were non-
academic professionals. All subjects were recruited through personal 
contacts and none of them had any prior experience of research in the 
areas of derived stimulus relations or RFT. 
Subjects were paid at the rate of 3 Irish pounds (4 U.S. dollars) an 
hour. They were given 1 Irish penny (1.3 U.S. cents) for every correct 
response, and lost 1 penny for every incorrect response. They were also 
paid 20 Irish pounds (27 U.S. dollars) for completing the entire 
experiment. Subjects were informed of these conditions by the 
experimenter before they agreed to participate in the study. 
All subjects were exposed to the experimental procedures 
individually. If a subject did not complete the experiment in one session, 
then he or she was asked to return on a subsequent day (usually the 
following day). To ensure that the previously established performances 
were still intact, at the beginning of the next session the subject was 
reexposed to those stages of the experiment that he had previously 
completed. On some occasions, therefore, a subject could successfully 
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complete a particular stage in the experiment, but would be reexposed to 
that stage for a second time. All subjects were asked not to discuss their 
participation in the experiment with anyone, and sessions were arranged 
so that subjects did not meet each other in the vicinity of the laboratory. 
When the experiment was finished subjects were thanked, debriefed, and 
paid the appropriate amount depending on their performance. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Each subject was seated in a small experimental room at a table on 
which was placed an Apple Macintosh™ Milcrocomputer (iMac) that 
displayed both colored stimuli and black characters on a white 
background. Stimulus presentation and the recording of responses were 
controlled by the computer, which was programmed using PsyScope TM, 
a graphical system for the design of psychology experiments (see Roche, 
Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 1999). A response involved using the mouse 
to 'click' on a chosen stimulus. 
Computer-generated stimuli. The experimental stimuli included 30 black 
and white pictures of various objects, 300 coloned shapes, 200 nonsense 
syllables, 4 arbitrary shapes as contextual cues, a small box in the middle of 
the screen in which stimuli appeared, and an eight-chambered box (see 
subsequent figures) at the bottom of the screen in which stimuli appeared. 
Subjects never saw the same configuration of stimuli twice across stages or 
within a particular stage of training and testing. 
Procedure 
All 5 subjects were trained and tested individually during sessions 
that lasted between 40 and 145 min each. The maximum number of 
sessions required to complete the experiment was three. The experiment 
involved nine stages. If a subject failed any test stage during the study, he 
was reexposed to all previous experimental stages. It was decided prior 
to the study that if a subject failed any test five times across the nine 
stages, then his participation in the experiment would be terminated (this 
never occurred, however). 
Stage 1(a): Same/different training with pictures. In this initial stage, 
subjects were first presented with the following instructions (to see instructions 
for any subsequent stages, the reader should consult Appendix 1): 
In a moment some images will appear on this screen. First, a box will 
appear at the bottom of the screen. Next, another image will appear 
above that. Then, another image will appear above that, and finally, 
two images will appear in the corners at the top of the screen. You 
should look first at the image that appears above the box. Next, look 
at the image that appears above that. Then, having looked at these 
two images, choose one of the two images in the top corners of the 
screen. Click the mouse when you are ready to begin. 
After subjects clicked on the mouse, the screen cleared for 1.5 s. The 
first stimulus then appeared 2 cm above the bottom of the screen. This 
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stimulus may be described as follows: An eight-chambered box, 
approximately 5 cm by 20 cm. Each chamber measured approximately 5 em 
in height and 2.5 cm across. The eight-chambered box was outlined by 
another box (see Figure 1, upper panel). One second later, the contextual 
cue, an arbitrary black shape measuring approximately 1.5 cm by 3-4 cm, 
SAME 
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Figure 1. Upper panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 1 (a & b) SAME/DIFFERENT training 
and testing, which employed picture stimuli. The SAME and DIFFERENT contextual cues were 
arbitrary shapes, but are shown here as English words for ease of communication. 
Lower panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 2(a & b) training and testing, which 
employed colored shape stimuli. 
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appeared approximately 2 cm above the center of the first stimulus. One 
second after that, the sample, a black and white picture measuring 
approximately 6 cm by 6 cm, appeared approximately 3 cm above the 
contextual cue, and then, 1 further second after that, the comparisons, two 
black and white pictures approximately the same size as the sample picture, 
appeared in synchrony in the top corners of the screen. 
On each trial, reinforcement was contin~Jent upon choosing the 
comparison that was similar to the sample in the presence of one particular 
arbitrary shape (%%%), and choOSing the comparison that was different from 
the sample in the presence of the other arbitrary shape (!!!). This training was 
designed to establish the functions of SAME and DIFFERENT, respectively, 
in these arbitrary shapes, so that from this stage on, these shapes might be 
expected to serve as contextual cues for SAME and DIFFERENT 
responding, respectively. Subsequently, these shapes/contextual cues will be 
referred to as SAME and DIFFERENT, respectively. 
Training was conducted in blocks of 12 trials. On each trial, the 
position of the comparison stimuli was varied randomly (i.e., the 
reinforced comparison could appear in either of the top corners of the 
screen with equal probability). Subjects chose a comparison by moving 
the cursor over the to-be-chosen comparison and then 'clicking' the 
mouse button. The correct completion of a training trial removed the 
stimulus display and produced the word "Correct (+1p)" in the center of 
the screen, accompanied simultaneously by a high pitched beep lasting 
approximately 1.5 s. The incorrect completion of a training trial removed 
the stimulus display and produced the word "Wrong (-1 p)" in the center of 
the screen accompanied simultaneously by a low, buzzing sound lasting 
approximately 1.5 s. A 1-s intertrial interval (i.e., the screen cleared and 
remained blank) followed all programmed consequences. Only when the 
subject demonstrated 12 out of 12 correct responses within a block was 
he allowed to proceed to testing. Conditions of training for this stage, 
including numbers of trials per block, nature of feedback, length of 
intertrial interval and criterion for advancing to tl9sting, applied also to all 
subsequent training stages. 
Stage 1 (b): Same/different testing with pictures. The same format 
was used in testing as in training. However, during the test the computer 
omitted all feedback messages and proceeded directly to the intertrial 
interval after the subject responded on each individual trial. Testing was 
conducted in blocks of 12 trials. If the subject failed to show 12 out of 12 
correct responses, then he was retrained and retested. Only when the 
subject demonstrated 12 out of 12 correct responses in a single block of 
testing was he allowed to proceed to Stage 2(a). As stated previously, if 
the subject failed Stage 1 (b), or any subsequent test stage, a total of five 
times then the subject's participation in the experiment was terminated 
(however, all subjects passed all stages within this five-exposure limit). 
Conditions of testing for this stage, including numbers of trials per block 
and criterion for passing, were the same for all subsequent testing 
phases, with the exception of Stage 9, which involved 24 test trials. 
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Stage 2(a & b): Same/different training and testing with colored shapes. 
Training and testing for Stage 2(a & b) employed the same basic format and 
procedure as were used in Stage 1. In Stage 2, however, the sample and 
comparisons were colored shapes (rather than black and white pictures) and 
subjects had to choose the comparison that was the same color as the 
sample, irrespective of shape (see Figure 1, lower panel). 
Stage 3(a & b): True/false training. At the start of each trial, the first 
FALSE TRUE 
l!J ~
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Figure 2. Upper panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 3(a & b) YES / NO training and 
testing. The SAME, DIFFERENT, YES, and NO contextual cues were arbitrary shapes, but 
are shown here as English words for ease of communication. 
Lower panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 4(a & b) training and testing, the purpose 
of which was to establish the relating of (nonarbitrary color) relations. 
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stimulus, the eight-chambered box, appeared 2 cm above the bottom of the 
screen (see Figure 2, upper panel). One second later, either SAME or 
DIFFERENT appeared approximately 2 cm above the center of the 
chambered box. Following another 1-s delay, the sample, a box measuring 
approximately 3 cm by 5 cm appeared approximately 3 cm above the 
contextual cue. Two colored shapes were located inside this box (see Figure 
2, upper panel). Finally, 1 s later, two arbitrary shapes, @ @ @ and ***, 
appeared in synchrony in the top corners of the screen. The respective 
position (i.e., left or right) of these stimuli was counterbalanced across trials, 
and this was the case for all subsequent stages. 
On each trial, the sample was a box containing either two same-
colored or two differently colored shapes. If the box contained two same-
colored shapes, then in the presence of SAME, choosing @ @ @ was 
reinforced, whereas in the presence of DIFFEF~ENT, choosing *** was 
reinforced. If the box contained two differently colored shapes, then in the 
presence of SAME, choosing *** was reinforced, whereas in the presence 
of DIFFERENT, choosing @ @ @ was reinforcl9d. In this way, training 
established the functions of TRUE and FALSE for the arbitrary shapes 
@ @ @ and ***, respectively. Subsequently, these stimuli will be referred 
to as TRUE and FALSE. 
Stage 4(a & b): Training responding to relations between relations. At 
the start of each trial, the eight-chambered box appeared 2 cm above the 
bottom of the screen (see Figure 2, lower panel). One second later, the 
contextual cue, either SAME or DIFFERENT, appeared approximately 2 
cm above the center of the first stimulus. OnEl second after that, the 
sample appeared approximately 3 cm above the contextual cue. The 
sample, which may be seen in Figure 2 (lower panel), consisted of a box, 
approximately 9 cm by 5 cm, containing two further boxes, both 
approximately 4 cm by 4 cm, each of which contained two colored 
shapes. One second after the appearance of the sample, TRUE and 
FALSE appeared in synchrony in the top corners of the screen. 
On each trial, the sample was a box containing two boxes, each of which 
contained either two same-colored or two differently colored shapes. If both 
boxes contained two same-colored shapes, then the relation between the 
relations in the boxes was one of sameness. If both boxes contained two 
differently colored shapes, then the relation between the relations in the 
boxes was also one of sameness. However, if one box contained two same-
colored shapes and the other box contained two differently colored shapes, 
then the relation between the relations in the boxes was one of difference. If 
the relation between the two relations was the same, then in the presence 
of SAME, choosing TRUE was reinforced, whereas in the presence of 
DIFFERENT, choosing FALSE was reinforced. If the relation between the 
two relations was different, then in the presence of SAME, choosing FALSE 
was reinforced, whereas in the presence of DIFFERENT, choosing TRUE 
was reinforced. In this way, subjects were trained to respond to relations 
between (nonarbitrary color) relations. 
Stage 5: Introducing nonsense syllables into the test for responding 
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to relations between relations. At the start of each trial, the eight-
chambered box appeared 2 cm above the bottom of the screen. During 
this stage, the box contained nonsense syllables superimposed upon 
colored shapes (see Figure 3). One second later, the contextual cue, 
either SAME or DIFFERENT, appeared approximately 2 cm above the 
center of the chambered box. One second after that, the sample 
appeared approximately 3 cm above the contextual cue. The sample was 
similar to that which appeared in Stage 4, except that each of the smaller 
boxes contained two nonsense syllables (rather than colored shapes). 
One second after the appearance of the sample, TRUE and FALSE 
appeared in synchrony in the top corners of the screen. 
FALSE TRUE 
IYER I POF 
IZAT I MIQ 
SAME 
Figure 3. A trial-type representative of Stage 5 testing. The SAME I DIFFERENT, YES, and 
NO contextual cues were arbitrary shapes, but are shown here as English words for ease 
of communication. 
Based on spatial contiguity, it was predicted that each of the 
nonsense syllables appearing in the chambers of the bottom box should 
acquire the color functions of the shapes upon which they were 
superimposed. In addition, because four of the nonsense syllables 
appearing in the bottom box appeared also in the box in the center of the 
screen, it was predicted that subjects would respond to these four 
nonsense syllables as functionally equivalent to those particular colors. 
Subsequently, subjects would be expected to respond in accordance with 
relations between relations in the same manner as in the previous stage. 
Stages 6 and 7: Relating nonarbitrary relations based on arbitrary 
relations of mutual entailment. At the start of each trial, the eight-
chambered box appeared 2 cm above the bottom of the screen (see 
Figure 4). During this stage, a number of the central chambers of the box 
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TRUE 
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Figure 4. Upper panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 6, which tested for the relating of 
nonarbitrary relations based on arbitrary relations of mutual entailment. In Stage 6 trial-
types involving difference cues, the nonsense syllable in a relation of different with a colored 
shape in one chamber always appeared in another chamber in a relation of same with a 
differently colored shape. This pairing helped to establish responding in accordance with the 
contextual cue of difference in the chambered box (see text). 
Lower panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 7, which tested for the relating of 
nonarbitrary relations based on arbitrary relations of mutual entailment. This stage differed 
from Stage 6 only in that there was no pairing of same and different relations in the bottom 
(chambered) box (see text) . 
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contained the following elements: a contextual cue (i.e., either SAME or 
DIFFERENT) at the bottom of the chamber and a box measuring 
approximately 4 cm by 5 cm, contain ing a nonsense syllable and a 
colored shape, at the top of the chamber. One second later, a contextual 
cue, either SAME or DIFFERENT, appeared approximately 2 cm above 
the center of the chambered box. One second after that, the sample 
appeared approximately 3 cm above the contextual cue. The sample was 
similar to that which appeared in Stage 4. One second after the 
appearance of the sample, TRUE and FALSE appeared in synchrony in 
the top corners of the screen. 
In this stage, subjects were required to observe the two relata 
(colored shape and nonsense syllable) and the contextual cue in each of 
the occupied chambers of the eight-chambered box before looking at the 
images that appeared above this display. Based on an experimental 
history of responding in the presence of the SAME and DIFFERENT 
cues, it was predicted that the functions of the nonsense syllables should 
transform according to specific patterns. For example, in the presence of 
SAME, a nonsense syllable should acquire the same color function as the 
shape over which it appeared. Furthermore, in the presence of 
DIFFERENT, a nonsense syllable should acquire a function of 'different 
color from the shape over which it appeared.' After the nonsense syllables 
acquired these functions, it was predicted that subjects should respond in 
accordance with relations between relations in the same manner as in 
previous stages. 
The reader should note that there were a number of trials in which 
one of the chambers contained a DIFFERENT cue. It was predicted that 
subjects would respond to the nonsense syllable inside the box above the 
cue as "different from" the colored shape inside the same box. In order to 
facilitate control by the DIFFERENT cue, during Stage 6 there was 
another chamber that contained a SAME cue underneath a box that 
contained a different-colored shape, but the same nonsense syllable as 
in the former chamber (see Figure 4). Extensive pilot work indicated that 
the simultaneous presence of these two chambers facilitated 
discrimination between the SAME and DIFFERENT contextual cues 
within the eight-chambered box. For illustrative purposes, consider Figure 
4 (upper panel); the two filled chambers furthest to the right contain the 
same nonsense syllable (i.e., KUE) with different colored shapes. One 
chamber contains a SAME cue and the other contains a DIFFERENT 
cue. The two respective cues indicate that KUE should be responded to 
as the same as one color, but different from the other. 
Stage 7 (see Figure 4, lower panel) was exactly the same as Stage 
6, except that on trials in which there was a chamber with a DI FFERENT 
cue, there was no counterpart SAME-cue chamber. In effect, the 
relational network did not specify what color should transfer to the 
nonsense syllable, only what color should not transfer. 
Stage 8: Relating nonarbitrary relations based on arbitrary relations 
of combinatorial entailment. This stage was identical to Stage 7, except 
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that all chambers in the eight-chambered box were filled on each trial. 
Furthermore, subjects could only produce experimenter-designated 
correct responses by combining the contextually controlled relations 
NO YES 
ILOK I URG 
18U~ I MEY 
SAME 
IGEFI I~ I~I ILOK I I~EY I I~ IBAB 1 IURGI BUX BAB ORO III WAK: 
SAME SAME SAME SAME SAME SAME SAME UlFF 
NO YES 
I NOMI RET 
10RTI 80S 
SAME 
~. NEK rRTI LEL I~KI I RET I XAL I~I :$: IX: I 1=1 I::~I SAME SAME SAME SAIt,iIE SAME SAME :SAME DIFF 
Figure 5. Upper panel: A trial -type representative of Stage 8, which tested for the relating of 
(nonarbitrary color) relations based on arbitrary relations of combinatorial entailment 
(analogical responding). This stage employed foils to ensure that subjects were in fact 
responding in accordance with relations of difference involving nonsense syllables. 
Lower panel: A trial-type representative of Stage 9, which tested for the same type of 
responding (i.e., analogical responding) as in Stage 8, but in which the colored shapes and 
nonsense syllables were completely novel. 
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across two chambers. In Figure 5 (upper panel), for example, the subject 
had to combine the relations specified in the first and third chambers 
(reading from left to right) in order to derive the color of BUX (via GEF). 
Similar to Stages 6 and 7 there were a number of trials in which one 
of the chambers contained a DIFFERENT cue. However, it is important to 
note that there were a number of trials in which this cue, though present, 
was not a part of the analogical relational network (see Figure 5, upper 
panel, for example). Such trial types were employed to ensure that 
subjects were not responding to DIFFERENT simply by doing the 
opposite of what they would otherwise do, but were actually responding 
in accordance with the complete relational network. 
Stage 9: Test for analogical responding with novel colors and shapes. 
This stage was identical to the previous stage, except that it involved 
completely novel colors, shapes, and nonsense syllables. Subjects 
received 24 trials, which, if completed successfully, would provide a 
demonstration of 24 completely novel examples of analogical responding 
as defined by Relational Frame Theory. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the number of trials required by each subject to 
complete training and testing for Stages 1, 2, 3, and 4, and to complete 
testing for Stages 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. For illustrative purposes, the data for 
Subject 1 will be described in detail. This subject required a total of 24 
trials to complete Stage 1 (a), Same/Different training with pictures, and 
he then passed the Stage 1 (b) test with 12/12 correct. He needed a total 
of 24 trials to complete Stage 2(a), Same/Different training with colors, 
and he then passed the Stage 2(b) test with 12/12 correct. The subject 
required 24 trials to complete Stage 3(a), TRUE/FALSE training, and then 
he passed the Stage 3(b) test with 12/12 correct. The subject was then 
exposed to 120 Stage 4(a) training trials (relating nonarbitrary relations to 
nonarbitrary relations), before finishing the experimental session for the 
day. On his return, the subject was reexposed to all previously received 
stages of training and testing and successfully completed Stage 4(a & b) 
and then Stage 5 (introduction of nonsense syllables into the test for 
relating relations) with 12/12 correct, before the end of that day's session. 
On his return, the subject was once more reexposed to all previous 
stages of training and testing, which he successfully completed. He failed 
on his first exposure to Stage 6 (relating relations based on arbitrary 
relations of mutual entailment) and was thus reexposed to all previous 
stages, which he successfully completed. He then failed Stage 6 once 
again, and was thus reexposed to all previous stages, which he again 
successfully completed. On his third exposure to Stage 6 he passed, and 
then he immediately passed Stage 7 (removal of redundant SAME cue 
from Stage 6), Stage 8 (relating relations based on arbitrary relations of 
combinatorial entailment), and finally Stage 9 (analogical responding with 
novel colors and shapes). 
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As can be seen through careful inspection iQf Table 1, all 5 subjects 
successfully completed all nine stages of the experimental protocol. Only 
1 other subject (Subject 5) required more than one experimental session 
before completing it, and Subjects 2 and 3 completed it without failing any 
of the test stages. These results provide strong support for the REP-
based model of analogy and demonstrate the power of this procedure to 
generate an in-principle infinite number of complex relational responses. 
Table 1 
Numbers of Training Trials in Stages 1 (a), 2(a), 3(a), and 4(a) and Numbers of Correct 
Responses in Testing Trials Stages 1 (b) , 2(b) , 3(b), 4(b) , 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 for All Subjects 
Sub SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. SI. 
No. 1 (a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b) 3(a) 3(b) 4(a) 4(b) 5 6 7 8 9 
24 12P 24 12P 24 12P 120 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 144 12P 12P 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12P 8F 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12P SF 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12P 12P 12P 12P 24P 
2 24 12P 24 12P 12 12P 120 12P 12P 12P 12P 12P 24P 
3 48 12P 24 12P 24 12P 144 12P 12P 12P 12P 12P 24P 
4 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 24 12P 12P 12P 12P 3F 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12P 12P 12P 12P 24P 
5 24 12P 12 12P 24 12P 60 12P 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12P 8F 
12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12 12P 12P 12P 12P 12P 24P 
Discussion 
The results of this study are that 5 subjects successfully completed 
the REP model of analogy. The subjects' behavior was successfully 
brought under SAME and DIFFERENT, and TRUE and FALSE, 
contextual control. The subjects were then trained to respond in 
accordance with relations between relations. Following this training, 
subjects were then provided with a series of increasingly complex tests 
involving relating relations, and by Stage 9 of the current protocol they 
readily demonstrated 24 completely novel instances of responding in 
accordance with analogical relations. Overall, these results provide strong 
support for the REP model of analogy. 
Subjects 2 and 3 passed through each stagle of training and testing 
with no need for any reexposure to earlier stages. Given the complexity of 
the final performances involved, these outcomes might seem unusual. 
However, the protocol reported herein evolved over the course of a long 
series of pilot studies involving sizeable numbers of subjects. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that once the subjects' behavior came 
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under the control of the relevant contextual cues, the performances 
simply involved the same overarching functional class of arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding during each subsequent stage of the 
protocol. Insofar as this was the case, the current study met its primary 
objective-to develop a procedure that successfully and readily produces 
responding in accordance with relations between relations. Having done 
so, subsequent research may now employ this procedure in order to 
examine the effects of other variables on this behavioral class. For 
example, one direction for future study could involve developing programs 
for establishing the relating of relations when this performance is found to 
be absent in the behavioral repertoires of particular populations 
(Alexander, White, Haensly, & Crimmins-Jeanes, 1987; Alexander, 
Willson, White, & Fuqua, 1987; Masterson, Evans, & Aloia, 1993). 
One stage of the protocol that some subjects failed more than once 
was Stage 6, which involved the introduction of both SAME and 
DIFFERENT contextual cues into the eight-chambered box for the first 
time. Initially, Stage 6 was omitted (Le., after completing Stage 5, subjects 
were exposed immediately to what is now called Stage 7). However, 
under these conditions, many pilot subjects did not come under the 
control of the SAME and DIFFERENT cues. Instead of responding in 
accordance with the DIFFERENT cue, these earlier subjects tended to 
respond to stimuli in the same box (Le., the nonsense syllable and the 
colored shape) as the same as each other. One likely reason for this was 
that the subjects' prior history with respect to the eight-chambered box 
(Le., Stage 5) involved treating spatially contiguous stimuli as the same 
as each other. Indeed, a number of recent studies have reported that 
spatial contiguity readily leads to the formation of equivalence classes in 
both adults and children (see Leader & Barnes, 1996; Leader, Barnes-
Holmes, & Smeets, 2000). Thus, spatial contiguity likely exerted greater 
control over responding with respect to the eight-chambered box than did 
the contextual cue of DIFFERENT (and possibly SAME). In order to gain 
control of responding by SAME and DIFFERENT in the context of the 
eight-chambered box, Stage 6 of the current protocol was introduced, in 
which the chamber containing the DIFFERENT cue had a counterpart 
chamber containing the same nonsense syllable with a different-colored 
shape and a SAME cue. As explained previously, the presence of these 
two chambers "highlighted" that the presence of a DIFFERENT cue in a 
chamber indicates that the color functions of the shape should not 
transfer to the nonsense syllable that appears in the same chamber. The 
responding of 3 of the subjects in this study came under the control of 
SAME and DIFFERENT immediately upon their exposure to Stage 6, but 
for 2 subjects, responding came under the control of SAME and 
DIFFERENT after a number of exposures to this stage. Future research 
may further explore the relative controlling power of spatial contiguity 
versus previously trained contextual cues. 
As is the case with any model of analogical reasoning, the current 
REP model likely fails to capture certain properties of this phenomenon. 
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However, many if not most of the properties not captured in the current 
model could be addressed successfully, both conceptually and 
empirically, in subsequent research. In what follows, we will attempt to 
show how this might be achieved. 
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, et al. (2001) reported a model of 
analogy as relating relations based on nonarbitrary similarity. The current 
model also demonstrated the relating of relations based on nonarbitrary 
similarity. However, whereas in the Stewart et al. model the relation 
between relations was always an equivalencH relation, in the current 
model , many of the trials involved responding in accordance with a 
relation of difference between relations. For example, on many trials, 
subjects had to affirm that an arbitrarily applicable relation of difference 
was applicable between two arbitrary relations, based on the nonarbitrary 
(color) relations between the shapes on the screen. Because analogy 
does not typically involve a relation of difference between relational 
networks, it could be argued that such performances are examples of 
highly unusual relational networks that arise rarely outside the context of 
a laboratory-generated artificial language, such as that created in the 
present experiment. The demonstration of examples of novel or unusual 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding such as this, alongside the 
types of relational responding that might ordinarily characterize language, 
is a particularly interesting development. It shows the potential of the REP 
as a means by which we may explore and test the boundaries of 
language, and by which we may even extend the boundaries of normal 
linguistic performance within the context of the laboratory (e.g., Ferreira, 
Christianson, & Hollingworth, 2001; Gibson & Thomas, 1999). 
The present REP model of analogy was a very basic one in that it 
involved the discrimination of formal or nonarbitrary similarity along only 
one physical dimension, namely that of color. Analogies in natural 
language typically involve formal or nonarbitrary similarities along 
numerous dimensions. Perhaps a more ecologically valid REP model of 
analogy, therefore, would involve multidimensional stimuli, from which a 
range of formal or physical properties might be abstracted (see e.g., 
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, et aI., 2001). In the present model, 
pictures of multidimensional stimuli were used in the first stage, Stage 1 (a 
& b), in order to establish contextual cues for SAME and DIFFERENT, but 
color was the only physical dimension that was relevant in later stages. A 
subsequent model of analogy might involve the use of such 
multidimensional picture stimuli throughout the experiment. 
There are many other conceptual and theoretical issues that have 
emerged from the current interpretation of analogy in terms of relating 
relations (see Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, et aI. , 2001; Stewart, 
Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Lipkens, 2001). The success of the current 
REP model provides an opportunity for the ernpirical analysis of these 
issues. Such work may well be important in that analogy and other related 
psychological phenomena, such as metaphor, have received little 
empirical attention within the behavior-analytic research community. 
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APPENDIX 
Instructions for Stages 1(a &b) and 2(a & b) 
In a moment some images will appear on this screen. First, a 
box will appear at the bottom of the screen. Next, another image 
will appear above that. Then, another image will appear above 
that, and finally, two images will appear in the corners at the top of 
the screen . You should look first at the image that appears above 
the box. Next, look at the image that appears above that. Then, 
having looked at these two images, choose one of the two images 
in the top corners of the screen. Click the mouse when you are 
ready to begin. 
Instructions for Stages 3(a & b) and 4(a & b) 
In a moment some images will appear on this screen. First, a 
box will appear at the bottom of the screen. Next, another image 
will appear above that. Then, another image will appear above 
that, and finally, two images will appear in the corners at the top of 
the screen. You should look first at the image that appears above 
the box. Next, look at the image that appears above that. Then, 
having looked at these two images, choose one of the two images 
in the top corners of the screen. Click the mouse when you are 
ready to begin . 
Instructions for Stages 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 
In a moment some images will appear on this screen. First, a 
box will appear at the bottom of the screen. Next, another image 
will appear above that. Then , another image will appear above 
that, and finally, two images will appear in the corners at the top of 
the screen. You should look first at the box. Then look at the image 
that appears above the box, and then at the image that appears 
above that, and then, having looked at these images, choose one 
of the two images in the top corners of the screen. Click the mouse 
when you are ready to begin . 
